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Two closely related numerical general equilibrium models of world trade are used to analyze the potential
consequences of US-China bilateral retaliation on trade flows and welfare. One is a conventional Armington
trade model with five regions, the US, China, EU, Japan and Rest of the World, and calibrated to a
global 2009 micro consistent data set. The other is a modified version of this model with monetary
non neutrals and including China’s trade surplus as an endogenous variable.
Who may gain or loss from global trade conflicts spawned by adjustment pressures in the post crisis
world is much debated. In a US-China trade conflict, Europe and Japan would seem gainers from preferential
access to US and Chinese markets. The loss of markets would hurt the US, but moving closer to an
optimal tariff could be the source of terms of trade gains. And the ease of substitution across trading
partners practices would determine costs for China.
Results from the conventional model suggest that retaliation between the two countries can be welfare
improving for US as it substitutes expenditures into own goods and improve its terms of trade with
non retaliatory regions, while China and non retaliatory regions maybe adversely affected. Results
in the endogenous trade surplus model from the central case model specification ,however, suggest
that both the US and the EU (the deficit regions) have welfare losses in most cases, while the surplus
region, China, and the ROW have welfare gains. In both models, when the bilateral tariff rates are
very high, gains accrue to the EU and Japan from trade diversion if the substitutions elasticities of
imports are high. Costs will are borne by the US and China in lost exports, lowered terms of trade
and adjustment costs at home.
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1.  Introduction 
Concerns permeate the global trade policy community today over the possibilities of 
major trade confrontations occurring over the next few years centered on, but not exclusively 
including, the US and China. These reflect a number of deep structural features in today’s 
global economy.   
One is the continued high growth rate of and level of China’s exports and the seemingly 
remorselessly growing adjustment resisting pressures in major export markets in North 
America and Europe. With Chinese export growth currently running at around 30% per year, 
exports are roughly doubling every two years and China now accounts for over 10% of 
world trade. The adjustment consequence for labor markets in the US and EU seem major 
and even growing larger, and with them will come more political pressure for protection.   
A second is the size of both the Chinese trade surplus and the US trade deficit and the 
perceived linkage to the onset of the 2008 financial crisis. As a result, the G20 process which 
the crisis has spawned has centered on the claimed need for rebalancing and with this 
pressures build for reduced trade growth by China. A third is memories of the 1930’s and the 
major trade compression which accompanied the breakdown of international economic 
cooperation at the time. Kindleberger(1970) documents a near 80% reduction in US trade 
that accompanied the 1929 depression and this past event reinforce the perceived need to 
contain retaliation today. 
 Previous simulation literature has only explored the potential consequences of 
retaliatory trade sequences in simple two country stylized settlings. (see Johnson(1953), 
Kuga(1973), Hamilton and Whalley(1983), Krugman(1991)). Here we go beyond this by 
considering bilateral retaliation in a 5 country model where non participants in the retaliation 
potentially benefit from preferential access to bilaterally protected markets. We also 
explicitly explore the impacts of retaliation in models both of classical form with exogenous 
trade imbalances (as in Whalley & Wang (2011)) and with monetary non-neutralities, fixed 
exchange rates and endogenous trade imbalances. These two forms of model both use the 
Armington assumption of product heterogeneity by country. 
 We calibrate these models to 2009 data for US, China, EU, Japan and the Rest of the 
World. We use nested CES functions in preferences and draw on literature estimates for key 
elasticity parameters, and exploring conventional CES production functions. Factors are 
assumed immobile across countries. 
  Our results suggest a number of key themes relevant to the global policy debate on the 
consequences of potential retaliatory episodes. One is that relative to existing 2 country  
simulation literature, generally the impacts of bilateral trade retaliation on trade and welfare   4
seem much smaller once other non retaliatory countries enter the analysis. Also, the impacts 
on the two countries directly engaged in bilateral retaliation can (depending on parameter 
specification) be welfare improving for both as they substitute expenditures into own goods 
and improve their terms of trade with both retaliatory and non retaliatory regions. Non 
retaliatory region can thus be adversely affected even though they have preferential access to 
markets of retaliating countries, since while they seemingly benefit from preferred access to 
retaliatory regions they suffer the adverse terms of trade consequences of the bilateral 
retaliation. Finally, the impacts of bilateral retaliation emerge as highly dependent on the 
chosen model structure. In models with endogeneity of the trade surplus (accommodated via 
a fixed exchange rate regime, non accommodative monetary policy and reserve accumulation) 
retaliation abroad which reduces exports and large reserve accumulation can reverse the  
sign of welfare impacts relative to conventional models. 
    We do not claim to produce definitive analysis of the potential impacts of a possible 
US-China retaliatory trade episode. But relative to available literature we are able to show 
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2.  The Impacts of Bilateral Trade Retaliation between US and China 
using a Traditional Approach 
We first describe a traditional five region Armington competitive numerical trade model 
which we have calibrated to 2009 data. We thus use a calibration generated parametric 
model specification to compare counterfactual equilibria and  different tariff retaliation 
scenarios to assess the effects of potential bilateral trade retaliation between US and China 
on the welfare of major world major economies. We do not explicitly compare post 
retaliation Nash equilibria, since in a multi country (more than 2) model, these are complex 
to compute. Existing numerical calculation literature for Nash equilibria does not extend 
beyond 2 countries. 
Armington Trade Model Structure 
 More formally, the model incorporates 5 regions (US, China, EU, Japan and ROW) 
indexed by  j or  m  ( 5 , 4 , 3 , 2 , 1  j , 5 , 4 , 3 , 2 , 1  m ) to denote region ,and 2 traded goods 
(manufactures and non-manufactures indexed  i( 1, 2 i  ) to denotes goods. Goods produced 
across the five regions are treated as heterogeneous (the Armington assumption). 
  For  each  good i  produced in region  j   ,we define the seller’s price (net of tariff) as 
j
i P , and allow each region m to impose tariffs at rate 
mj
i t  (  region  m’s tariff on good  i 
imported from region    j ) on each imported good. These change as we consider alternative 
retaliatory scenarios. Tariffs are set to zero for exports. Internal (gross of tariff ) prices for 
good  i  produced in region j are thus 
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On the production side, we use a two sector (manufactures and non-manufactures), two 
factor (capital and labor) structure. We assume production is CES, and the production 
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where 
j
i Y is the output of good i produced in region j and 
j
i  is the substitution term 
among components of value added (capital and labor) in sector i in region j, 
j
i K  and 
j
i L  
refer to the factors capital and labor used in production of good i  in region j. 
j
i    is 
productivity parameter of sector i in region  j , and 
j
i   are share parameters in CES 
functions. 
First order conditions for profit maximization imply:   6
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  where 
K
j P  and 
L
j P   are market factor prices for capital and labor in region j. We 
assume factors are mobile across sectors and immobile across regions. 
On the demand side a single set of final demand functions applies for each region 
resulting from maximizing a nested CES utility function subject to a regional budget 
constraint. Within this functional form, a hierarchy of substitution possibilities applies, and 
between the two kinds of goods (manufactures and non-manufactures), then between 
composites of imports across sources and comparable domestic products, and finally 
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Figure 1 : HIERARCHY OF SUBSTITUTION POSSIBILITIES IN THE MODEL   
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where 
mj
i X   is region m’s consumption of goods i produced in region    j 
( 5 , 4 , 3 , 2 , 1  j , 5 , 4 , 3 , 2 , 1  m   to denote regions) ,and the 2 traded goods (manufactures and 
non-manufactures ) are indexed  i( 1, 2 i  ) . 
Factor markets clearing implies: 
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j K and 
j L   and are endowments of capital and labor in region j. 
 
 
Model Calibration and Counterfactual Experiments 
We have constructed a model admissible data set for 2009 for this structure which we 
use to determine model parameters through calibration . We use calibrated model parameters 
to experiments for changes in country tariffs for the US and China as part of an assumed   
retaliatory bilateral trade policy sequence . Alternative equilibria associated with different 
bilateral tariff levels can then easily be computed. Our base case data captures 2009 trade, 
production, and consumption by region. 
In Table 1, we report the 2009 base year date used to calibrate the model. GDP data is 
from the World Bank’s WDI database. The EU-27’s GDP data is calculated by adding GDP 
of member countries. Trade data is taken from the UNCOMTRADE database. F.o.b. exports 
values as reported by exporting regions are used. Tariff data is from WTO Statistic Database. 
Labor input data is from China’s NBS data .The U.S. Bureau of Labor of Statistics, Eurostat 
stastistics and International Labor Statistics.   8
 
Table 1 
Base Case Data For 2009 for Five Regions Used in Calibrating the Basic Model 
 
Table 1-1    2009 GDP by Sector by Region (Billion $) 
  US China  EU-27  Japan  ROW 
  Manu  Non- 
Man  Manu  Non- 
Manu  Manu  Non- 
Manu  Manu  Non- 




2647.45 11608.85 2292.98  2691.75  4339.92 12048.22 1469.58 3597.95  5207.59 12323.90 
GDP  14256.30   4984.73   16388.15   5067.53   17531.49  
Source: World Bank WDI database. 
      Table  1-2  2009  Factor  Inputs by Sector by Region (Billion $) 
  US China  EU-27  Japan  ROW 




















Manu  1087.699 1559.751 217.092 2075.884 2923.913   1416.011 600.917   868.667      2125.110 3082.480 
Non-Manu  5251.513 6357.337    373.728 2318.026 7701.835   4346.388 2366.184 1231.762    5681.159 6642.744 
Total  6339.212   7917.088   590.820   4393.910  10625.748 5762.399 2967.101 2100.429    7806.269 9725.224 
Source: China’s NBS , the U.S. Bureau of Labor of Statistics, Eurostate stastistics and International Labor Statistics. 




US China    EU-27  Japan  ROW  World 
US 
Man  0  39.464  175.114 30.624 493.169 738.371 
N-Man  0  30.107   40.996   20.536  212.725   304.364  
Total 0  69.571  216.11  51.16  705.894  1042.735 
China  
Man  215.155  0  289.353 87.183  545.38 1137.071 
N-Man  6.140   0  9.573   10.728  38.133   64.574  
Total 221.295  0  298.926  97.911  583.513  1201.645 
EU-27 
Man 236.732  98.869  0  41.186  881.783  1258.57 
N-Man  43.017   13.924   0  7.935   257.429   322.305  
Total 279.749  112.793  0  49.121  1139.212  1580.875 
Japan  
Man 88.222  96.455  75.277  0 258.417  518.371 
N-Man  7.079   13.208   2.430   0  35.147   57.864  
Total 95.301  109.663  77.707  0  293.564  576.235 
ROW 
Man  607.945 480.27 501.961  139.713  0  1729.889 
N-Man 388.877  233.257  600.060 213.256  0  1435.450   
Total  996.822  713.527  1102.021  352.969 0 3165.339 
Total 
Man 1148.054  715.058  1041.705  298.706  2178.749  0 
N-Man 445.113  290.496  653.059 252.455 543.434    0 
Total  1593.167 1005.554 1694.764 551.161 2722.183  0 
Source: UNCOMTRADE database 
   9
For the central case model analyses there is limited literature yielding elasticity 
parameters and so these are set as follows. The production elasticities are all set equal to 0.5. 
The top level consumption substitution elasticity between manufactures and non- 
manufactures goods is set equal to 0.5 in all regions. The second level trade elasticities 
between domestic and imported commodities follow a “rule of two” as discussed in Hertel al. 
(2009), that is the substitution elasticity between domestic and imported goods is set equal to 
2. This rule was first proposed by Jomini et al.(1991) and later tested by Liu, Arndt,and 
Hertel(2002) in a back-casting exercise with a simplified version of the GTAP model. The 
third level elasticities, ie substitution elasticities between the four imported goods in each 
country are also set at 0.5. We then change the third level substitution elasticities in 
sensitivity analysis to change the strength of terms of trade effect. 
We have used our calibrated model to analyze the effects of bilateral trade retaliation 
between US and China on welfare, terms of trade, production and trade flows. The scenario 
we analyze is one of assumed progressive trade retaliation. In step 1, the US first imposes a 
tariff at rate 25% on import of China’s goods, and in step 2 China’s reaction is a 25% tariff 
rate on import of US’s goods. In step 3, the US increases its tariff rates to 50% on imports of 
China’s goods and so on. This continues until in step 8 for which US and China each use a 
100% bilateral tariff rate.   
All the results of impact of retaliation are calculated as relative to the base year 
dataset.The welfare impacts of this trade retaliation sequence are measured as equivalent 
income variations (EVs) by region, with the arithmetic sum of EVs reported as the 
worldwide welfare gain or loss.   
Underlying the welfare effects given by the model are the effects of trade retaliation 
between US and China on terms of trade. An improvement of the terms of trade raises the 
price of a region’s exports relative to its imports; while a deterioration has the opposite effect. 
If protection is below the level implied by a set of optimal tariffs, the terms of trade will 
typically improve, but if the opposite holds they can deteriorate relative to the base case data. 
The combined welfare effects can attributed to only changes in the terms of trade and the 
domestic welfare impact of tariff distortion and these combine to produce the total effect.   
This simple decomposition provides a convenient point of reference for interpreting 
model results. The measure used here is the net barter terms of trade, which measures using 
fixed quantity weights the relative price in index-number form of a composite of imports in 
terms of a composite of exports for each region. Here benchmark domestic production 
quantities are used as weights, and the terms of trade are calculated as a producer price 
index.    10
Model Results 
Results for bilateral retaliation between the US and China using the central case 
specification of the Armington model are reported in Tables 2 and 3. These results show that 
increasing protection in US and China yields substantial gains to the US and losses to China, 
Japan and ROW. The EU experiences either small gains or losses under different levels of 
bilateral retaliation between US and China.   
 
 Table  2 
Welfare Impacts of a China-US Trade Retaliation Scenario in a   
Traditional Armington Model 







Step1  Step2 Step3 Step4 Step5 Step6 Step7 Step8
US’ tariff on China  25%  25%  50%  50%  75%  75%  100%  100% 
China’s tariff on US  0%  25% 25%  50% 50% 75% 75%  100% 
Welfare impacts (EVs in $billion) 
US 67.215  59.753  112.222  106.55 149.314 144.798 180.723 177.007 
China -39.021  -18.744  -50.767  -34.908 -62.158 -49.175 -72.962 -61.989 
EU 3.089  -0.666  1.741  -1.509  0.453 -2.437 -0.786 -3.404 
Japan -5.098  -5.278  -9.669  -9.943 -13.832 -14.158 -17.671 -18.028 
ROW -29.58  -31.176  -56.178  -58.261  -80.063  -82.394 -101.817 -104.276 
Total -3.395  3.889 -2.651 1.929 -6.286 -3.366 -12.513  -10.69
Percentage change in terms of trade   
US 4.143  3.444  6.97  6.425  9.519  9.075 11.848 11.476 
China -2.595  -0.896  -2.999  -1.537 -3.308 -2.013 -3.545 -2.374 
EU -0.018  -0.313  -0.355  -0.614 -0.668 -0.903 -0.964 -1.179 
Japan -0.55  -0.704  -1.19  -1.338  -1.778 -1.921 -2.324 -2.462 
ROW -0.396  -0.621  -0.971  -1.178 -1.494 -1.688 -1.977 -2.159   11
Table 3 
Changes in Trade Flows from Trade Retaliation in the Traditional Armington Model 
  US  tariff   Chinese  tariff  
on  Chinese  on  US  goods 
goods     
Imports  by     
Step 1  25% 0% 
Exports by US China EU Japan ROW
US 0 -6.34% -1.76% -2.84% -2.58%
China -12.87% 0 -4.66% -5.55% -5.16%
EU -0.76% -7.64% 0 -4.43% -4.24%
Japan -1.47% -7.93% -3.80% 0 -4.38%
ROW 0.43% -7.90% -3.68% -4.77%  0
Step 2  25% 25% 
Imports by      
Exports by US China EU  Japan  ROW
US 0 -15.04% -2.00% -2.78% -2.54%
China -12.59% 0 -3.94% -4.61% -4.17%
EU -1.31% -5.80% 0 -4.30% -4.04%
Japan -1.95% -6.03% -3.85% 0 -4.15%
ROW -0.09% -6.27% -3.56% -4.41%  0
Step 3  50% 25% 
Imports by      
Exports by US China EU  Japan  ROW
US 0 -19.50% -3.46% -5.12% -4.63%
China -22.07% 0 -7.67% -9.04% -8.27%
EU -2.10% -11.78% 0 -7.87% -7.43%
Japan -3.35% -12.22% -6.91% 0 -7.65%
ROW 0.15% -12.42% -6.53% -8.24%  0
Step 4  50% 50% 
Imports by      
Exports by US China EU  Japan  ROW
US 0 -25.72% -3.71% -5.13% -4.65%
China -21.85% 0 -7.14% -8.34% -7.54%
EU -2.55% -10.40% 0 -7.85% -7.35%
Japan -3.74% -10.80% -7.03% 0 -7.55%
ROW -0.26% -11.22% -6.50% -8.03%  0
Step 5  75% 50% 
Imports by      
Exports by US China EU  Japan  ROW
US 0 -29.06% -4.96% -7.12% -6.42%
China -29.19% 0 -10.24% -12.02% -10.93%
EU -3.34% -15.29% 0 -10.84% -10.17%
Japan -5.06% -15.85% -9.61% 0  -10.47%
ROW -0.13% -16.23% -8.98% -11.23%  0
Step 6  75% 75% 
Imports by      
Exports by US China EU Japan  ROW
US 0 -33.75% -5.20% -7.18% -6.47%
China -29.01% 0 -9.83% -11.48%  -10.35%
EU -3.72% -14.20% 0 -10.88% -10.15%
Japan -5.40% -14.73% -9.76% 0  -10.43%
ROW -0.47% -15.30% -9.01% -11.11%  0
Step 7  100% 75% 
Imports by
Exports by US China EU Japan  ROW
US 0 -36.37% -6.29% -8.91% -8.00%
China -34.91% 0 -12.48% -14.62% -13.24%
EU -4.49% -18.31% 0 -13.44% -12.56%
Japan -6.64% -18.98% -11.97% 0 -12.93%
ROW -0.41% -19.50% -11.14% -13.85%  0
Step 8  100% 100% 
Imports by
Exports by US China EU Japan  ROW
US 0 -40.05% -6.54% -8.99% -8.08%
China -34.75% 0 -12.15% -14.19% -12.76%
EU -4.83% -17.42% 0 -13.53% -12.59%
Japan -6.94% -18.07% -12.15% 0 -12.94%
ROW -0.70% c-18.76% -11.19% -13.79%  0
(Central Case Specification)  12
For step 1,when US initially increases its tariffs on China to 25%, the US has a welfare 
gain of $67.215 billion, but while China has a welfare loss of $39.021 billion. For step 2, 
when China retaliates and increases its tariff on US to 25%, US suffers a small welfare loss 
compared to step1 and the US welfare gain relative to the base year falls to $59.753 billion, 
China in contrast, has a welfare gain compared to step 1, China’s welfare loss relative to the 
base year falls to 18.744 billion dollars.   
With increasing bilateral retaliation, US welfare gains increases, and China’s welfare 
losses also increase, as shown in step 4 and 8, US has a welfare gain of 106.55 billion 
dollars when the bilateral tariff rate is 50% in both US and China, and 177.007 billion 
dollars when the bilateral tariff rate is 100%, China has a welfare loss of 34.908 billion 
dollars when the bilateral tariff rate is 50% in both US and China, and 61.989 billion dollars 
when the bilateral tariff rate is 100%. Japan and ROW have increasing welfare losses with 
increasing bilateral trade retaliation between the US and China. Japan and ROW have 
welfare losses of 18.028 billion dollars and 104.276 billion dollars respectively when the 
bilateral tariff rate is 100% in both US and China. The welfare change in the EU is small, a 
3.089 billion dollar gains in for step 1 and a -3.404 billion dollar loss for step 8.   
These welfare changes are collinear with terms of trade effects generated by the model. 
Table 2 also reports the terms of trade effects for the bilateral trade retaliation cases. The US 
always receives a terms of trade gain, because bilateral tariff retaliation diverts US 
expenditures to US goods. Other regions suffer a deterioration in there terms of trade, but 
the result is sensitive to the specifications of demand elasticities. 
Changes in trade flows by region from the bilateral trade retaliation between US and 
China are reported in Table 3. Bilateral trade between U.S. and China decrease significantly. 
In step 4, when the bilateral tariff rate is 50% in both US and China, China’s exports to U.S 
fall 21.85% percent, and U.S.’s exports to China fall 25.72%. In step 8, when the bilateral 
tariff rate is 100% in both US and China, China’s exports to the U.S fall 34.75% percent, 
U.S.’s exports to China fall 40.05%. U.S.’s exports to other regions also fall with increasing 
retaliation. World trade also shrinks with increasing bilateral retaliation.   13
3.  Analyzing Bilateral Retaliation in a Model with Trade Surplus 
Adjustments  
An Endogenous Trade Surplus Model 
The traditional Armington model set out above can be extended on to incorporate non 
neutral monetary and exchange rate policy as in Whalley & Wang(2011). This endogenous 
trade surplus model reflects a managed Chinese exchange rate and a monetary regime with a 
peg and RMB inconvertibility. Monetary policy is non accommodative to the chosen fixed 
exchange rate, and the excess supply of foreign exchange is accommodated by the Central 
Bank as additions to reserves .   
This model characterizes reserve accumulation as driven by government or central 
bank policy which sets non accommodative monetary policy given the exchange rate and 
simply absorbs any excess supply of foreign currency it is offered at the set exchange rate 
maintaining inconvertibility of domestic currency. This model embodies a simple monetized 
extension of a conventional trade model but with the added structure that the trade surplus is 
endogenously determined. The model we use specifies a monetary regime using monetary 
non-neutralities reflecting the actual Chinese exchange rate and monetary regime. Given a 
large trade surplus in China, if this is endogenously determined in the model the effects of 
bilateral trade retaliation can appear as quite different.   
On the demand side of the model, utility functions are same as in the Armington model 
with a 3 level nested CES form. To extend the traditional Armington trade model to 
incorporate a endogenously determined trade surpluses (and deficits for others) we use a 
simple monetized extension to a pure barter trade model with a transactions demand for 
money and unitary velocity of circulation. In the 5 region model with the U.S, China, EU, 
Japan and rest of the world, we assume that there are two kinds of currencies: the Renminbi 
and the US dollar. The US, EU ,Japan and ROW are assumed to use the US dollar as their 
currencies, and the money supply of the US meets the money demand of US, EU, Japan and 
ROW.  
This two currency treatment is adopted for convenience, and to help us focuses on the 
role of an endogenously determined Chinese trade surplus can play in assessing the impacts 
of bilateral retaliation. China is thus assumed to fix its exchange rate and has non- 
accommodative monetary policy, US is assumed to fix its money stock.   14
For country 1 (China), maximizing country 1’s utility, ie: 
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yields demands, m C  is the nested CES composite of demands in region  m, 
mj
i X is 
region m’s consumption of goods i produced in region j ,  e is the fixed exchange rate,  m S  
is the trade surplus of region  m, and  m TR   is the tariff revenue in region  m. 
 For other regions (regions 2,3,4,5 are referred as US, EU, Japan, ROW) that use the 
US dollar as their currency, the demand functions are derived from: 
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  From the 2009 data used for calibration the model, the surplus countries are region 
1(China), region 4(Japan) and region 5 (ROW), while the deficit countries are region 2(U.S)   
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We assume the money supplies of region1 (China) and region 2 (US) are fixed at  1 M  
and  2 M . For simplicity, each of these two regions is assumed to have a constant unit 
velocity in their transactions demand for money. In equilibrium, this implies: 
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i P   is the seller’s price of goods i produced in region j , 
j
i Y   is the output 
of goods i produced in region j.  
The production functions are the same as in the traditional Armington model.      15
Calibration and Conterfactual Analysis 
                                                                                      
We use the same data set and elasticities in calibration with this extended model as in the 
traditional Armington model for our central case analyses .To convert Chinese data into 
units consistent with other regions data in $, we construct an artificial Chinese currency unit, 
* RMB , which implies that 1 unit of 
* RMB  equals 1 US dollar. To do this, ,we set as 
RMB RMB 83 . 6
*  , the exchange rate of the US dollar to Renminbi in 2009. This 
convention is adopted so that in calibration all equilibrium prices will be unity for both 
Chinese and other regions goods and factors. We then examine a similar sequence of 
bilateral retaliatory steps. 
 
Table 4 





















Value of Production  4984.730 14256.300 16388.147  5067.530 17531.493   58228.20 
Surplus  -196.091 550.432 113.889 -25.074  -443.156    0 
Money Supply  4984.730  53907.791     
 
Results 
Table 5 reports the welfare impacts of bilateral trade retaliation in the endogenous trade 
surplus model. Results are strikingly different with the exogenous trade surplus model. The 
deficit regions, US and EU have welfare losses in most cases, while the surplus region, 
China and ROW have welfare gains. Japan has small gains or losses under different levels of 
bilateral retaliation between US and China. Bilateral trade retaliation reduces global 
imbalances, as both the US and EU trade deficits falls and these two countries suffer welfare 
losses. China and ROW have large trade surplus in base case, and bilateral trade retaliation 
reduces their surplus, and they receive welfare gains unlike in the traditional model. Japan 
has a relatively small surplus in the base case, and the sign of the effects of bilateral 
retaliation on Japan’s welfare varies. China receives terms of trade gains with increasing 
bilateral retaliation, US receives terms of trade gains, while the EU, Japan and ROW 
experience    terms of trade losses in most cases. 
     
                                                 
1  We construct an artificial Chinese currency unit, RMB*, we set it as RBM*=6.83 RMB, which is the 
exchange rate of the US dollar to Renminbi in 2009, this implies that 1 unit
* RMB equals 1 US dollar. This 
convention is adapted so that in calibration all equilibrium prices will be unity. 
   16
Table 5     
 
Welfare Impacts of a bilateral China-US Trade Retaliation Scenario in the 
Endogenous Trade Imbalance Model   
  (Central Case Specification) 
 
The results reflect the feature that in the trade imbalance endogenous model, countries 
running surplus receive paper in return for put of their export of goods and the paper does 
not directly yield welfare. Trade policy which reduces trade surplus thus yields welfare 
gains to surplus countries and welfare losses to deficit country. 
The changes in trade flows by region that results from the bilateral trade retaliation 
between US and China are shown in Table 6. Bilateral trade between U.S. and China 
decreases significantly. For step 4, when the bilateral tariff rate is 50% in both the US and 
China, China’s exports to U.S fall by 21.15%, U.S. exports to China fall by 19.68%. For 
step 8,  when the bilateral tariff rate is 100% in both US and China, China’s exports to U.S 
fall by 33.26% percent, and U.S. exports to China fall by 31.36%. U.S. exports to other 
regions also fall with increasing retaliation. World trade shrinks with increasing bilateral 
retaliation, similar to the Armington model. 
 
Step1 Step2 Step3 Step4 Step5 Step6  Step7  Step8
US tariff on Chinese goods  25%  25%  50%  50%  75%  75%  100%  100% 
Chinese tariff on US goods   0%  25%  25%  50%  50%  75%  75%  100% 
Welfare impacts (EVs in $billion) 
US -70.131  -2.757  -56.554  -0.353 -43.872  4.673 -31.842  11.097 
China 26.448  11.332  31.735  17.753 34.324 21.276 35.214 22.949 
EU -28.632  -15.297  -37.852  -26.881 -45.543 -36.148 -52.107 -43.842 
Japan 5.019  -0.624  2.88  -1.921 0.664  -3.559  -1.579  -5.377 
ROW 84.219  21.007  83.582  30.841 80.004 34.376 74.518 34.063 
Total  16.923 13.661  23.791 19.439  25.577 20.618 24.204  18.89 
Percentage change in terms of trade   
US -0.2048  1.4543  1.5041  2.9472 3.1385 4.4294 4.7052 5.8819 
China -0.437  0.1077  -0.1898  0.2747 0.0615 0.4707 0.3129 0.6813 
EU -0.652  -0.6102  -1.1635  -1.1395 -1.6254  -1.612 -2.0482 -2.0415 
Japan 0.2416  -0.3413  -0.2109  -0.7156 -0.6501 -1.1001 -1.0755 -1.4846 
ROW 0.5623  -0.1862  0.1915  -0.4451  -0.1785 -0.7373 -0.5433 -1.0444   17
  Table 6 
Changes in Trade Flows from Trade Retaliation in the Extended Model   
(Central Case Specification) 
  US  tariff   Chinese  tariff 
on  Chinese  on  US  goods 
goods 
Imports  by     
Step 1  5%  0% 
Exports by US China EU Japan ROW
US 0 0.15%  -0.94%  0.77%  1.41% 
China -14.47%   0  -0.93%  0.77% 1.27% 
EU -4.10% 0.04% 0  0.63% 1.19% 
Japan -3.95% 0.46%  -0.64%  0  1.58% 
ROW -2.98% 0.39%  -0.88%  0.95% 0 
Step 2  25%  25% 
Imports by      
Exports by US China EU  Japan  ROW
US 0 -11.34%  -0.48%  0.02%  0.44% 
China -12.30% 0  -1.10%  -0.58%  -0.10% 
EU -1.69% -1.14%  0  -0.86% -0.43% 
Japan -1.93% -1.03% -1.28% 0  -0.30% 
ROW -0.49% -1.33% -1.16%  -0.67%  0 
Step 3  50%  25% 
Imports by      
Exports by US China EU  Japan  ROW
US 0 -11.13%  -1.23%  0.59%  1.51% 
China -22.82% 0  -1.92%  -0.11% 0.79% 
EU -4.97% -1.10%  0  -0.53%  0.35% 
Japan -5.14% -0.69% -1.92%  0  0.79% 
ROW -2.79%  -1.02%  -1.95%  -0.08%     0 
Step 4  50%  50% 
Imports by      
Exports by US China EU  Japan  ROW
US 0 -19.68%  -0.86%  -0.07%  0.69% 
China -21.15% 0  -2.09%  -1.26%  -0.36% 
EU -2.94% -2.19%  0  -1.81% -1.02% 
Japan -3.44% -2.04% -2.48% 0  -0.80% 
ROW -0.65% -2.57% -2.20%  -1.47%  0 
Step 5  75%  50% 
Imports by      
Exports by US China EU  Japan  ROW
US 0 -19.46%  -1.49%  0.36%  1.55% 
China -29.24% 0  -2.83%  -0.96% 0.30% 
EU -5.68% -2.17%  0  -1.64% -0.48% 
Japan -6.16% -1.76% -3.10% 0  -0.02% 
ROW -2.52% -2.32% -2.92%  -1.09%  0 
Step 6  75%  75% 
Imports by      
Exports by US China EU Japan  ROW
US 0 -26.14%  -1.18%  -0.22%  0.84% 
China -27.90% 0  -2.98%  -1.98%  -0.71% 
EU -3.91% -3.18%  0  -2.77% -1.67% 
Japan -4.69% -3.01% -3.60% 0  -1.40% 
ROW -0.64% -3.74% -3.15%  -2.31%  0 
Step 7  100%  75% 
Imports by
Exports by US China EU Japan  ROW
US 0 -25.93%  -1.72%  0.12%  1.55% 
China -34.37% 0  -3.65%  -1.79%  -0.20% 
EU -6.27% -3.16%  0  -2.71% -1.29% 
Japan -7.05% -2.78% -4.19% 0  -0.81% 
ROW -2.21% -3.53% -3.82%  -2.07%  0 
Step 8  100%  100% 
Imports by
Exports by US China EU Japan  ROW
US 0 -31.36%  -1.45%  -0.41%  0.91% 
China -33.26% 0  -3.80%  -2.71%  -1.09% 
EU -4.70% -4.11%  0  -3.73% -2.35% 
Japan -5.75% -3.94% -4.65% 0  -2.05% 
ROW -0.51% -4.85% -4.03%  -3.16%  0   18
4. Sensitivity Analysis 
Results from both exogenous trade surplus model and endogenous trade surplus model 
change as the parameter values used for the functions adopted vary. The key parameters are 
the substitution elasticities between domestic and foreign goods (
2
d  ), and the elasticity of 
substitution between imported goods (
3
d  ). Tables 7 and 8 give sensitivity results for 
welfare and terms-of –trade impacts for 3 alternative elasticity specifications of both models.   
In the exogenous trade surplus model, in the central case, we use the settings 
0 . 2
2  d  , 5 . 0
3  d  . In the first sensitivity variation we set  0 . 2
2  d  , 0 . 2
3  d  , Increasing 
the substitution elasticity between imported goods, the welfare gain to U.S. falls, and EU, 
Japan and ROW receive welfare gains. The welfare loss to China increases a little. For the 
second sensitivity variation are set  0 . 1
2  d  , 0 . 2
3  d  . Here, the welfare gain to the U.S. 
falls further, and with increasing tariff retaliation, the U.S. receives a welfare loss, while the   
EU, Japan and ROW receive gains. China suffers further welfare losses. These welfare 
changes are collinear with terms of trade effects. Decreasing substitution elasticities between 
domestic and foreign goods, the diversion of US’s import demand to domestic consumption 
is less, and with a higher elasticity of substitution between imports, US    demand is more 
heavily diverted to EU, Japan, and ROW goods.   
In endogenous trade surplus model, sensitivity results are similar to those from the 
exogenous trade surplus model. Decreasing elasticities between domestic and imported 
goods and increasing of substitution of imported goods , the U.S suffers welfare losses and a 
deterioration in their terms of trade, while the surplus regions of Japan and ROW gain. 
China suffers a further welfare losses and deterioration in their terms of trade. The EU also 
suffers a welfare losses. 
When elasticities between domestic and imported goods are low and substitution 
elasticities among imported goods are high, (eg. 0 . 1
2  d  , 0 . 2
3  d 
,) , increasing bilateral 
US-China retaliations suggests that U.S. may lose in both exogenous and endogenous trade 
surplus model. In Table 7 and 8, when both U.S and China have bilateral tariff rates as high 
as 100% (in case 8), the U.S. suffers a welfare losses and a deterioration of terms of trade in 
both models. Because a tariff by the US against China is effectively a tax on US exports to 
China, the gains to the US alone from trade diversion will be smaller if the substitutions 
elasticities between imports are high. The major loser may thus be the U.S.   19
Table 7    Sensitivity Analysis: Welfare Impacts of Possible US-China Trade Retaliation (EV $billion) 
 
 
US tariff on 
Chinese goods 
Chinese tariff   
on US goods 
 
Traditional Armington Model Endogenous  Trade Imbalance Model     
0 . 2
2  d    5 . 0
3  d      US China EU Japan  ROW    US China  EU  Japan  ROW 
Step1  25% 0%  67.215  -39.021  3.089  -5.098  -29.580   -70.131  26.448  -28.632  5.019  84.219 
Step2  25%  25%  59.753  -18.744 -0.666 -5.278 -31.176   -2.757  11.332  -15.297  -0.624  21.007 
Step3  50% 25%  112.222  -50.767  1.741  -9.669  -56.178   -56.554  31.735  -37.852  2.880  83.582 
Step4  50%  50%  106.550  -34.908 -1.509 -9.943 -58.261   -0.353  17.753  -26.881  -1.921  30.841 
Step5  75%  50%  149.314 -62.158  0.453 -13.832  -80.063   -43.872  34.324  -45.543  0.664  80.004 
Step6  75%  75%  144.798 -49.175  -2.437 -14.158  -82.394   4.673  21.276  -36.148  -3.559  34.376 
Step7  100%  75%  180.723 -72.962  -0.786 -17.671 -101.817   -31.842  35.214  -52.107  -1.579  74.518 
Step8  100%  100%  177.007 -61.989  -3.404 -18.028 -104.276   11.097  22.949  -43.842  -5.377  34.063 
0 . 2
2  d    0 . 2
3  d     US China EU Japan  ROW    US China  EU Japan ROW 
Step1  25% 0%  37.814  -39.088  5.804  -0.508  -6.636   -199.621 53.003  -49.407 10.667  196.883 
Step2  25%  25%  25.931  -28.877 4.058 0.159  0.215   -134.430  33.798  -33.239  7.754  138.189 
Step3  50% 25%  38.823  -52.394  7.672  -0.059  -2.961   -249.825 61.723  -58.946 13.386  241.585 
Step4  50%  50%  32.187  -50.483 6.674 0.308  0.762   -214.311 47.051  -50.213 11.830  210.017 
Step5  75%  50%  34.456  -65.500 9.055 0.223 -0.771   -288.694 63.525  -65.294 15.185  271.265 
Step6  75%  75%  30.421  -66.591 8.436 0.445  1.467   -267.320 52.093  -60.059 14.261  252.407 
Step7  100% 75%  27.982  -76.668  10.079  0.424  1.616   -318.901 62.599  -69.651 16.429  291.744 
Step8  100%  100% 25.364  -78.845 9.670 0.570  2.207   -305.043 53.457  -66.265 15.837  279.579 
0 . 1
2  d    0 . 2
3  d      US China EU Japan  ROW    US China  EU Japan ROW 
Step1  25%  0%  33.863  -48.652 7.881 0.425  3.423   -238.501  45.366  -65.698  9.031  257.309 
Step2  25%  25%  14.368  -39.629 3.864 1.131 22.619   -198.473  33.837  -53.375  7.872  221.407 
Step3  50%  25%  22.849  -69.060 8.464 1.599 28.816   -345.942 58.888  -88.782 12.911  362.854 
Step4  50%  50%  11.781  -68.417 6.184 2.013 40.133   -328.062 48.800  -83.095 12.443  348.052 
Step5  75%  50%  9.401  -87.264 9.011 2.454 46.887   -427.256 63.893  -104.295 15.579  434.809 
Step6  75%  75%  2.558  -89.665 7.605 2.720 54.189   -419.623 55.389  -101.616 15.408  429.145 
Step7  100%  75%  -4.479  -102.317 9.412 3.106 60.676   -490.433 65.082  -115.269 17.509  486.493 
Step8  100%  100%  -8.999  -105.770 8.489 3.296 65.712   -487.896 57.928  -114.082 17.479  485.133 
  : elasticity of substitution of between domestic and foreign products 
  : elasticity of substitution of imported goods.   20
 
Table 8    Sensitivity Analysis: Percentage Change in Terms of Trade 
 
 
US tariff on 
Chinese goods 
Chinese tariff   
on US goods 
 
Traditional Armington Model Endogenous  Trade Imbalance Model     
0 . 2
2  d    5 . 0
3  d     US  China  EU  Japan  ROW    US China  EU  Japan  ROW 
Step1  25%  0%  4.143 -2.595 -0.018 -0.550  -0.396   -0.2048  -0.4370  -0.6520  0.2416  0.5623 
Step2  25%  25%  3.444 -0.896 -0.313 -0.704  -0.621    1.4543  0.1077 -0.6102 -0.3413 -0.1862 
Step3  50%  25%  6.970 -2.999 -0.355 -1.190  -0.971    1.5041 -0.1898 -1.1635 -0.2109  0.1915 
Step4  50%  50%  6.425 -1.537 -0.614 -1.338  -1.178    2.9472  0.2747 -1.1395 -0.7156 -0.4451 
Step5  75%  50%  9.519 -3.308 -0.668 -1.778  -1.494    3.1385  0.0615 -1.6254 -0.6501 -0.1785 
Step6  75%  75%  9.075 -2.013 -0.903 -1.921  -1.688    4.4294  0.4707 -1.6120 -1.1001 -0.7373 
Step7  100%  75%  11.848 -3.545 -0.964 -2.324  -1.977    4.7052  0.3129 -2.0482 -1.0755 -0.5433 
Step8  100%  100%  11.476 -2.374 -1.179 -2.462  -2.159    5.8819  0.6813 -2.0415 -1.4846 -1.0444 
0 . 2
2  d    0 . 2
3  d      US China EU Japan  ROW    US China  EU Japan ROW 
Step1  25%  0%  2.108  -2.960 0.371 0.150  0.160   -2.920  -1.289  -0.501  0.520  1.825 
Step2  25%  25%  1.085  -2.143 0.306 0.186  0.246   -2.368  -0.961  -0.288  0.437  1.373 
Step3  50%  25%  2.310  -3.921 0.536 0.284  0.357   -3.933  -1.642  -0.543  0.716  2.353 
Step4  50%  50%  1.738  -3.461 0.499 0.304  0.404   -3.644  -1.467  -0.426  0.674  2.110 
Step5  75%  50%  2.492  -4.602 0.651 0.372  0.484   -4.423  -1.769  -0.501  0.820  2.555 
Step6  75%  75%  2.142  -4.321 0.629 0.385  0.513   -4.423  -1.769  -0.501  0.820  2.555 
Step7  100%  75%  2.627  -5.092 0.735 0.435  0.574   -5.046  -2.031  -0.590  0.931  2.940 
Step8  100%  100%  2.399  -4.908 0.720 0.444  0.593   -4.939  -1.964  -0.545  0.917  2.847 
0 . 1
2  d    0 . 2
3  d      US China EU Japan  ROW    US China  EU Japan ROW 
Step1  25%  0%  1.772  -4.092 0.645 0.355  0.556   -6.619  -2.463  -1.413  0.287  4.342 
Step2  25%  25%  0.037  -3.580 0.508 0.415  1.074   -6.558  -2.278  -1.109  0.360  4.048 
Step3  50%  25%  0.801  -6.034 0.906 0.647  1.523   -10.269  -3.643  -1.888 0.504 6.581 
Step4  50%  50%  -0.176  -5.812 0.831 0.688  1.842   -10.398  -3.596  -1.750  0.554  6.521 
Step5  75%  50%  0.105  -7.389 1.095 0.852  2.210   -12.732  -4.442  -2.221 0.641 8.142 
Step6  75%  75%  -0.495  -7.294 1.050 0.881  2.423   -12.911  -4.448  -2.158  0.675  8.176 
Step7  100%  75%  -0.452  -8.363 1.233 1.002  2.728   -14.497  -5.013  -2.463  0.734  9.284 
Step8  100%  100%  -0.846  -8.330 1.205 1.024  2.880   -14.680  -5.041  -2.438  0.759  9.356 
  : elasticity of substitution of between domestic and foreign products 
  : elasticity of substitution of imported goods.   21
5.  Concluding Remarks   
    This paper assesses the potential consequences of a US-China trade retaliation 
scenarios on trade flows and welfare using two related numerical general equilibrium trade 
models involving five major world trading areas. The first model is a conventional trade 
Armington model with an exogenous trade surplus. The second model incorporates non 
neutral monetary and endogenous trade imbalances structure. We calibrate these models to 
2009 data, and using the calibrated parameters ,we analyze the impacts of progressively 
increasing bilateral trade retaliation between US and China. 
  Results from the first model using a central case elasticity specification suggest that US 
as the large country would receive both a welfare and terms of trade gain under bilateral U.S 
and China retaliation. Bilateral tariff retaliation diverts US expenditures to US’s goods. 
Other regions suffer a deterioration in both welfare and the terms of trade despite a 
preferential trade diversion effect .Bilateral trade between U.S. and China decreases 
significantly. World trade also shrinks with increasing bilateral retaliation.   
Results from the endogenous trade imbalances model using the central case model 
specification suggest that in contrast US and EU (the deficit regions) will experience  
welfare losses while the surplus regions, China and ROW, have welfare gains, Japan 
experiences small gains or losses under different levels of bilateral retaliation between US 
and China. China receives terms of trade gains with increasing bilateral retaliation. The US 
receives terms of trade gains, while the EU, Japan and ROW experience terms of trade 
losses in most cases. 
Elasticity values in both models affect the results. The U.S lose in both the traditional 
Armington and endogenous trade surplus models when the bilateral tariff rates as high as 
100% ,since a tariff by the US against China is effectively a tax on US exports to China. The 
EU and Japan can gain from trade diversion if the substitution elasticities among imports are 
high. The largest cost will be borne by the US and China in lost exports, lowered terms of 
trade and adjustment costs at home. With sequential tariff retaliation, Japan, EU and ROW 
progressively gain preferential access to US and Chinese markets.   22
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